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The place of bodily asceticism in a nation's social structure

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The place of bodily asceticism in a nation's social structure*

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abstract

The hypothesis to be verified explains why bodily asceticism is excluded, owing to the influence of the ideologist, from the system of public health in the structure of a liberal cratocracy, in which reason is the good of the authority for its own sake. In the structure of national society, the system of bodily asceticism is raised to the status of community good. Despite the blocking of the connectivity of the system of bodily asceticism to the social structure, academic gymnasiums survived the collapse of the state. Each of them independently excused itself with the idealess reason of the market in physical services, the undoubtedly important reason for the private network of fitness clubs but failed to meet the expectations of the fraction of the community of scholars who constantly aspire to fulfil public tasks relevant to the cultural community of the nation. Modernising the system of bodily asceticism located by the authorities, within the structure of public health, can be achieved with the participation of both philosophers and teachers of physical culture.

Key words social structure, bodily asceticism, public health, social structure of physical culture

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INTRODUCTION

Bodily asceticism in the area of sociology and the philosophy of physical culture is the subject under consideration in this essay. Asceticism means a relationship, i.e. referring an activity to its whole; because it is a reference of the entity to itself, the vector of activity of asceticism is self-referential. Asceticism is an activity of bodily improvement, and also a spiritual one; the activities of bodily formation are assigned different meanings depending on the reasons justifying the meaning of the higher activities. The social role of an ascetic includes all the activities and relationships established in the cultural group of the *gymnasion* – the organizational centre of the physical culture social system. Bodily asceticism logically precedes every social relationship. At a macro level it creates the structure of physical culture as well as the structure of public health, which both potentially sit within the structure of society as a whole. Depending on the causative-ideological model of society the structure of physical culture can be validated or eliminated, transferred into a state of potentiality. The principle of top-down causality used to analyse social reality allows us to understand the reason why there is no structure of bodily asceticism in the structure of a liberal-democratic state.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STRUCTURALISM

1. The question of structure belongs in geometry, and the question of both the natural and observable objects of the structure, to physics – from the word *physis* (gr. Φύσις) – denoting natural beings. It could not be otherwise, as it is known that general ontology, which explains the nature and causality of being, resolves that objects remain relational beings, whereas relationships are not self-existent beings. Unobservable objects from which the world is composed can be recognised by the relations occurring between them, which is why a physicist can participate indirectly in their exploration. This peculiarity of the world of natural objects (existing in quantum) has led physicists to divide the images of the world (and indeed metaphysical approaches) into **epistemological structuralism**. Accordingly, relationships which create structures and contain implicit metaphysical assumptions about the existence of these unobservable objects as well as **ontological structuralism**, in which the world is composed only of relationships [1], are the source of knowledge of the objective world.

Regardless of, or rather, along with this discussion of physicists and philosophers of science, **mathematical structuralism** as used in physical theories leads to a sensational-sounding (in a traditionally accepted sense) realism of the metaphysical point of view. According to this, it is considered through “the search for the true nature of reality”; the mathematical structure is the Physical World itself (the structure of our physical world is a mathematical structure) [2], and not, as it has been claimed so far, that mathematical structures (so successfully studied by physicists) lead to acquiring knowledge of the World’s Structure. In other words, mathematical structures, by reflecting reality, remain in “a certain resonance with the structure of reality” [1]. The author of this way of thinking admits himself that he represents “a quite crazy belief that our physical world can not only be *described* mathematically, but that it actually *is* mathematics, which makes us self-aware elements of a giant

mathematical object". As for Tegmark's understanding of reality, the physicist understands it as "the ultimate nature of the external physical world" [2].

With this revolutionarily-sounding ontological view which promises a revolution of thought in the fundamental meaning of the legitimacy of the realistic (or more precisely the materialistic) approach in science, we are dealing in cosmology, and of course in the very heart of quantum physics. The view of the quantum physicist, who introduces a new order of thought to transcendental metaphysics, which will have an impact on "all scientific processes" (as Goswami, the perpetrator of the *coup*, admits) sounds even bolder after the adoption of an image of the World "based on the primacy of consciousness" [3]. Goswami, as every scientific realist, asks himself about "the nature of reality", causing amazement when he "orders" quantum physics to adopt "top-down causality". In this, the spirituality of quantum dynamics, or the soul itself, which is a collection of quantum capabilities (having non-local and unstructured properties) and which assigns creative potential, is manifested in the localised structure of the physical body. He does not say that quantum spirituality provides the body with structure, but only that it gives life to it locally, while at the same time reincarnating itself. Thus he does not decide about the idea of a human being's structure and he does not reach the conclusions relevant to epistemological structuralists in physics. They claim that physical reality is "permeated" with mathematical structure and not (as in the Neoplatonic hypostasis of material beings) that the material world, which is the final emanation of the spiritual world accessible to human reason, follows this world, and so, it "emerges" from this world, whatever that means. Just as in the Christian hypostasis, material corporeality is preceded by the *Logos*, which is "at the very beginning" and precedes the physical reality which "becomes" flesh.

2. I quote these examples concerning the understanding of structuralism in the mathematical sciences of nature, to draw attention to the human sciences which are considered a subset in the widely-understood context of natural science. This is determined, on the one hand, by cosmology, and on the other hand by quantum physics, which both need to find their confirmation in anthropological cognition. In the ontological perspective, they have to come across "the case" of the human being considered as a microcosm: atomistic and quantum, in which for some the mathematical structures are the expression of the completion of intelligent design, and for the others a confirmation of the existence of the *Logos* of the spiritual world - which precedes physical reality - and which finds its realignment in the bodily structure. It is as if, by following the stoics (in particular Heraclitus), they aspire to find in this way of thinking, which states that immanent rationality is contained in the personal dimension of man while participating in the Rationality of the universe, and *as the law, directing the course of nature, and which should shape the course of human actions* [4, p. 229].

3. When we ask about society we must bear in mind that it is a rational being, created by participants in the same activity and always with its own assigned meaning. Thus by analogy we call the social structure "the social geometry" and the objects that are relationally bound with each other, "social physics". Relationships in social reality do not exist independently of "objects. This obviously does not rule out the ability to recognise them as separate structures,

but in no way can learning about society be reduced solely to “network links”. A sociologist must ask not only *who* starts the network, but also *what* reason justifies the desire for its realisation. He must ask about the reasons for its creation, or as defined by a metaphysician, about the *tertium comparationis*, which is the basis of the created relationship, and understood as the third component in the relationship between objects: the subject, the end point and the rationale [5, p. 127]. The sociologist must ask about culture, as the supreme regulator of social structure, in which this reason, as a notion of good, forms the core of the normative reality of thought. This is not because the objects of social reality are observable (as opposed to objects in the field of quantum physics), but because it is ontologically impossible that society is limited only to relationships, and thus to the reality of existing outside the objects correlated with each other. Just as there are no social relations without conscious entities, so, in the same way entities which are aware of their concurrent positions will not create a society – even of the lowest ontological rank, the *interaction* – if any activities initiated by both correlates are not justified by the same reason. In general, there is no society without **supreme reason** – in this case defined as supreme good – that justifies all the activities of its entities. If, in other words, entities do not share the desire to establish social relations because they desire the same values for themselves, then there is no structured society. There is no society without truth. This was justified by Sorokin in his theory of the super-system, “and that means that society is not the existence of thousands of different ways of life, but that systems of supra-local values hide behind this multiplicity, which have to be taken into account if one wants to understand the dynamics of cultures, and world history” [6, p. 726].

There is something in all of this. Indeed human individuals – independently of each other – can gather as a group, without any reason, but at the same time, if they do not establish mutual relationships, they do not form any social structure. “Shapeless” they can acquire knowledge of some reason that would unite them if only for a moment. And isn’t there a common expression: “shapeless mass”? For as long as they do not themselves try to understand the reasons justifying the need for integration, the group will not turn into a community, that is a basic structure composed of at least interactive social relations, the simplest possible being. A good example of this is a recent situation in the port of Calais, where a crowd of refugees made their way *en mass* towards the ferry, all, of course, with the same intention which was known to each one of them independently. Simple interactive relations between a possible leader-usurper and the rest of a crowd give a reason to mass activity. That was enough for a formless mob to obtain a short-term form, an elementary social structure with the shape of a figure and not a “geometrical solid”.

4. For a sociologist what society, as a reality created by sentient beings, is, is not a problem because it is a network of relationships created by self-correlating “objects”, which also gives particular meaning to these relationships. Therefore, for a sociologist, **ontological structuralism**, according to which only relationships which come to this reality under investigation and nothing more, is not a problem. As a kind of reductionism it would be a cognitive concession, if not a surrender since it is known from *the sociology of humanistic coefficient*, that society cannot be reduced (with a metaphysical spell) solely to social relations. Thus, ultimately it should be considered as formal education,

which becomes a comparative study of “figures” or “geometrical shapes”, omitting the subjects of relational references and reasons triggering their active pursuit of accomplishing the desired good (*ratio boni*).

METAPHYSICS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Let us recall the fact that when one object refers to another object, exerting influence on it, this is a relationship. Let us also remember that if the relationship is to exist, both a *subject* and *the end* of the relationship (*subiectum* and *terminus*) are required, as well as the *basis* for the relationship (*fundamentum*). This is understood as “the reason, the cause to which an entity refers to the end” [5, p. 127]. The relationship, as the reference of one object to another, i.e. one subject to another conscious subject, gains the ontological status of an accidental event (*accidens*). As is known, each chance event does not exist independently, but as a being inherent in the essential being, it obtains its reality through personal correlates, which consciously express a striving to co-existence according to the principle of active co-operation.

The structure of society can obviously be explored by using the abstraction, a method that extracts from its ontic deposits only those realities that may be perceived outside the subject – without its participation. As an analogy, we might get to know to know “city life” or even multiple clusters of habitation from a height so distant that the social reality is only observable in photographs as communication routes, where its users are not visible. When one chooses such an observational “bird’s eye view” method to get to know a society, it cannot be said that a person cannot be seen, only the systems of roads where someone is undoubtedly moving with a particular purpose. It cannot be said that this imaging is cognitively useless, because it does not represent society. But equally it cannot be said that such imaging of a population exhausts the content of its acquisition and that communication routes are all that the society as a whole is composed of. When the writers responsible for some excellent war media coverage portrayed battlefields from space (literally, from a height of several dozen kilometres), they did not argue that the object of their knowledge exhausted the content of the message. Indeed thanks to computer zooming technology they went from the high-ceiling overview to “ground” imaging, which revealed the faces and actions of the actors in war events. They behaved exactly as sociologists, who take some ontological level as their object of cognition, from which (without losing sight of the social whole) they take out nomothetic generalisations of the relevant range of reality. They do not say that the truth about the parts removed from the whole entitles them to apply their conclusions to the whole of social reality, but as they are aware of the risks of falsehood contained in the rule of *pars pro toto*, they limit their reasoning to the frames of the subject of research. So they bring into sociology their bit of creative thinking; nevertheless, they do not think that the cognitive reality they had brought in is all that sociology can afford. A sociologist is allowed to create a theory of social structure, when the object of the cognition of society is reduced merely to social relations which are the relative reference of beings to each other and exist extremely realistically as their *accidens*. At the same time, he deliberately ignores its simpler and most elementary ontic components. By restricting himself to the highest level of abstract cognition, he will not go so far in his process of purifying the “communication framework” of

society, led by an obsession with ontological formalism (on the way to acquiring knowledge of pure forms), and lose orientation as to the justifying reasons for this framework. If he did not take this – a principle establishing not only the structure, but also each component of the ontological society – into account he could not pass judgement on its cultural identity and membership of the given social structure to the owner of a normative system. This would particularly be the case if that collective owner of the field of thought about himself, eulogised the ideal: the moral (humanistic, anti-humanistic, ahumanistic), political (monarchist-conservative, conservative-republican, democratic-liberal, socialist, imperialist, militarist), economic (capitalist, globalist, fiscal) or religious (personalistic, fundamentalist, atheistic) or other, in any ideological and normative form.

What is more, the sociologist would not be able to explain the causes of intra-structural variations or the origin of differences between structures which undoubtedly result from society adopting the idea of good and normative standards which determine the exact course of action. It is as if a cartographer, in drawing up the geopolitical outline of a state's societies while satisfied with the accuracy of the resulting form, omitted its colour which symbolises the values recognised by society and is contained in its perfect culture. Such a map of the political entities of societies would not have any orientation value. Its user would not be able to determine which ideological space of the "visited" social structure he is living in.

Returning to the example of learning about society from "a bird's eye view", this is a way of getting to know it, let's call it disregarding specific features of a subjective battlefield. This delivers amazingly new and unknown observational data, both scientific and empirical in character, and not just pragmatic and useful in devising a strategy of war. The conclusion may be drawn that only at a sufficiently high level of abstraction towards the ultra-fine ontic particles of social reality (appropriate to the knowledge-acquiring subject) that the details disappear out of sight can the sociologist focus on the relationships themselves. He can, therefore, omit the following elements: the levels of movement, behaviour and action of a single entity, and the cooperation between both two and many interacting ones i.e. the group level; the level of organisation at which objects reveal their status and roles; and finally, the level of cultural reality, where agreed patterns of action are located he therefore sees no movement in these entities in deeds and actions or of cooperation between two or many entities. He does not observe them in larger groups or environmental and organizational clusters, striving towards the cultural fields of awareness; he does not observe, because by this cognition of society he is not going to penetrate the increasingly complex ontic layers. In getting to know society the sociologist focuses solely on relationships (*communication routes*), i.e. everything that exists between the entities and which – what this sociologist is familiar with – society as a whole cannot be reduced to.

METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURALISM

This way of getting to know society, in which the social relations themselves become the subject, can be called "methodological structuralism". This is obviously taken together with the base (*fundamentum*), i.e. the rationale for goodness (*ratio boni*), justifying their importance, with the exception of any objects of correlations.

The mere understanding of the relationships between objects as well as the relationship of the object to itself would have no cognitive value if the explanation of the cause of the relative incident was omitted. What is more, to adjudicate on the dependence between relationships, their resulting one from another or conditioning of one by the other would not be possible without taking into account the basis of the relationship. In exactly the same way – figuratively describing the dependence between relationships – main arterial communication routes gain their validity because they are linked to sub-routes and local roads, from which the former (let's call them the road routes of "final" destination) originate. No artery, even the most important in the road network, may be validated if there is no validating of the route which is subordinate to the middle-ranking relation, and back to the very beginning of the process of validation, the local relationship. The condition for validating the main communication artery is validating the relationship of the lowest-ranking road to the network of all the roads.

If the object refracting the potentiality of a communication relationship is heading towards the final destination in its activity, then the reason for the relationship of the lowest rank is the supreme good, which in turn justifies the succession of relationships: from the lowest and local, through the higher relationship of the middle-ranking right up to itself, as the relationship of the final level. This is due to the fact that the local communication relationship does not justify itself through its own reasons. In the same way, the *motorway relationship* which the entity initiates by its activity (by going from a lower relationship to a higher one) objectifies itself ontologically as much as the communication community eventually gives it an appetitive status of its own. A community locates the demand for a final rationale in its normative culture, in the formula of the idea of the supreme good. It can be said then that the communication relationships form a network whose rationale is the supreme good recognized by the objects validating this as the most desirable being on the way to achieve partial good (*bonum partiale*). The condition of the final relationship in the communication network system is the elementary relationship, the lowest in rank, though indispensable in its fulfilment.

From a logical point of view, the fulfilment of the final communication relationship can occur without a lower relationship (just as a road map can only contain descriptions of main routes and omit local roads), but in the order of things, the lower relationship is a prerequisite for higher relationships. Although the route is not on the map, it must in fact exist. The arterial relationship cannot validate itself, though its meaning is justified by the highest reason (there is no motorway without access roads). And vice versa, despite the fact that a local relationship can be updated solely for itself, the full meaning of its destination is complex, "far" beyond it, in the reason of the supreme good. If the local relationship is not integrated into the higher relationships, leading to the acquisition of the horizon of medium-range reason, it will remain a relationship without any sense. The locality of life then will be based on "experiencing" physical life. When physical life "for itself" is the only real relationship, then this senseless relationship is not preceded by a relationship of corporal asceticism. This is certainly the only relationship in a potentially hierarchical social structure, in which corporal asceticism – if it presumptively preceded a relationship of physical life "for itself" – would be a total nonsense. As the relationship of asceticism gains its full meaning

when it is justified by reasons of personal moral dignity – as the highest reason in social life – so does it become a completely pointless relationship, when the relationships of social life cease, and the only validation is obtained by the relationship of physical life “for itself”. In this logical exercise that I have imposed on myself one thing obsessively comes to my mind. It is the character of a rural Hamlet who “forms” a relationship with his physicality to “use” its corporeality¹. When the structure of being of this *amateur actor* is integrated into the relationship for its own sake, it makes no sense. The *amateur actor*, who establishes a relationship only with his physicality, is nothing but an Uroboros monster, which as a sign of its boundless stupidity (at least for intellectual simpletons), feeds itself by devouring itself, starting the “feast” with its own tail.

BODILY ASCETICISM AS THE RATIONALE FOR THE LOWEST RANK

This approach to social relations as a network of relationships, creating a hierarchical social structure, will allow us to understand the importance of the social relations of bodily asceticism, which is the most “local” relationship and can even be reduced to an intra-entity self-referential relations (described by some people as a relationship “for oneself”). At the same time this meaning is incomprehensible if it is considered as the relationship itself, i.e. independent of all other social relations. It would also be equivalent to the silent anthropological assumption – burdened with the error of naturalism – of the possibility of living for oneself, for one’s own bodily nature with the possible, therefore not imperative, tying of the “thread of agreement” with society. The possibility of being “tethered” to another entity is ontologically impossible, just as it is impossible for an individual to make a naturalistic escape from society. The entity cannot “alternatively” remain a relational being, and at the same time be a being forming a relationship exclusively with itself. To both be and not to be a social entity; man is either a social entity or does not exist at all. Such an anthropological adjudication is allowed by the principle of the excluded middle, which states that “something is or is not” [5, p. 41]. A social subject, which by way of a logical operation “undergoes” individualisation, becomes a different being: a social person becomes an individual. The subject must then be considered in a different order of cognition from the sociological one.

The return to its naturalness is understood as a self-referential relationship between the subject to its corporeality and, more generally, the return to its structure of being. This takes into consideration an improvement in various *accidens* and becomes meaningful only when it is justified by a higher reason assigned to a social reason, or indeed, any reason. Examples of social relations in which two entities may be interested include wealth, parenting or veracity.

If the means of existence is a relationship with another, it has its *reason* for good which justifies its meaning. The reasons of wealth, parenting or veracity give meaning to each of these social relations. So if, despite the ontological constant (which a relationship is), each of them would be expected to establish a relationship with the other. By attributing a biotic reason to this inbred

¹ I have in mind a picture by Duda Grac entitled “Hamlet polny” (Rural Hamlet), which presents a bodily distorted image of a dirty, obese and exhausted peasant who appears to be asking himself: “to be or not to be”. The artist seems to attribute an existentially momentous thought to this character, placing a skull next to the sitting peasant.

relationship, i.e. bodily “healthiness to enhance healthiness” and “vitality to enhance vitality,” this inbred non-social relationship could be only justified by a higher reason.

Relating bodily asceticism as a relationship to itself may not make sense in itself. It acquires a meaning only when it is recognised jointly by the rationale of a higher order. In the same way, a stream flowing from the source to the river is known as a *tributary*, i.e. it changes its ontological status when it is recognized in connection with the wider mainstream, flowing into the mainstream of the river. Then in attempting to understand the relationship between the river's currents “from the top”, we can say that the main river current which leads to its final self-fulfilment at the river's mouth (or some other final estuary) provides meaning to the validity of indirect currents, justifying them with its highest ranking rationale. A similar metaphorical comparison was used by Tischner in his ethical considerations of the hierarchical relations between values when he used the example of a cable car while explaining how the foundations of this vehicle in which its bearing span gains the value of a lower order owing to the car and the whole cable car has a higher value. The higher value gives meaning to the importance of the lower value². The foundations would not have the status of a lower value were it not for the higher value which gives it meaning. The foundations as a self-existing object would not achieve the status of a value on its own.

In general, life as life does not provide meaning to itself even though it is accompanied by a natural inner rationale. If life is not only about existence itself, then what value gives it meaning, using the rule of value logic that the higher value funds the meaning of a lower value? *It is worth living for the sake of living when, in social life, a person exists for another person*, as a maximalist would say. Only then does the moral dignity of a person become the reason for physical life. It is when asceticism becomes a relationship that it gains greater importance. It is a paradox that bodily asceticism – the social relation of the lowest rank – may acquire the highest rank of meaning.

Generally speaking, the importance of every relationship is growing, including the social relations of asceticism, when personal relations are at the edge of holiness. Therefore, is it not a true ethically negative assessment of the relationships of asceticism, whose importance is determined by reasons of resentment or hatred of the other person as well as the relationship of depersonalisation of itself, manifested in individualistic selfishness?

In the light of both anti-humanistic and unhumanistic reasons, the social relations of bodily asceticism at the lowest rank lose their importance and ultimately become meaningless. And what about the fact that a selfish person establishes a relationship of asceticism with himself/herself when the only reason for their life is life for themselves? When life loses its validity, which the selfish person probably does not realise, and their efforts to enhance their body size, in some cases to extremes, vitalism or healthism no longer make sense, and they become absurd.

As Tischner taught, “the value of life is founded on the values which a person can devote their life to” [7, p. 378-379]. It is only after recognising the *logos*

² Tischner, referring to Scheler, wrote that “higher value is the value funding the lower value”, in the quoted metaphor it means that “cable car is value that funds/sponsors the stanchion”. [c.f. 7, p. 377].

contained therein, by the intellectual effort of the subject to acquire the knowledge of their complex moral duty, that physicality obtains social meaning. In other words, the procreative relationship between spouses, and life as life, is justified by reasons of mutual love, and more generally by personal moral dignity. Understanding the moral meaning of corporeality must, however, be preceded by the establishment of a social relationship between a man and a woman. Going further and getting to know the meaning of moral bodily asceticism must be preceded by getting to know the validity of educational activities whose goal is to activate a sense of responsibility for this vital and procreative bodily formation. Bodily formation as an activity, or bodily asceticism as a relational being, "is waiting" for its justification, as it cannot justify itself. As a non-social relationship, justifying the reason for itself – health for health, and vitality to enhance bodily vitality – it is absurd. If a person does not exist solely in a relationship, being addicted to the other person, then whatever he/she does alone may be justified by reason of a social relationship (a social relationship justifies with its reason non-social relationship) in fact a higher a relationship, towards the inbred relationship (intrapersonal), which is the lowest relationship in the ontological order of social structure. Thus the social relations of bodily asceticism, as a lower-ranking relationship of being, is always justified by reason of a higher relationship by providing it with meaning, while the sense of the higher relationship is justified by a reason even higher in the hierarchy, that is, the idea of good that at the same time justifies the sense of all other relationships. This creates a social structure which, in a formal sense, is a hierarchical structure (like a multi-level geometrical solid), and within normative meaning it must always be recognised as "someone's" structure. In this definition the idea of good (always different, and certainly never the same, nor is the reason of supreme good defined in the same way) justifies the meaning of all social relationships: relationships of higher and lower rank which reduce themselves to self-referential beings, and elementary relationships set up so that the higher relationships which lead to the fulfilment of the social structure in its cultural ideal find a real ontic anchor in them.

The social structure consists of lower and higher relationships which permeate into each other. If they are looked at "from below", this starts with the local and the lowest, which permeates the higher one in a medium-range of normativity, right up to the arterial, which has the highest, appetitive rationale. Looked at "from the top", the wider relationships spread to the narrower ones, and their partial rationale gains full power of meaning when it is "illuminated" by the idea of supreme good. In this regulatory light whose glow radiates from the ideological top of culture the social relations of bodily asceticism, despite its lowest rank, gain the status of validity under the same conditions of necessity, as *sui generis*, have the tributaries of rivers which flow into the mainstream. Even the queen of rivers does not grant "grace" to its local tributaries, and recognising their necessity, because – having self-awareness of its own existence – it must consider them to be life-giving to it. **Even the smallest river adds to greatness of the queen of rivers.**

It is clear from the metaphorical imagining of social structure (as a hierarchical network of relationships) that the highest rationale justifying the meaning of the lower relationships, including bodily asceticism, can be freely and variously determined by ideological leaders. The mistake of ahistoricism in the sociological exploration of hierarchical social structures would be the view

regarding the possibility of obtaining the full logical truth about them, with a metaphysical assumption denying the fact that social reality is causal-and-ideological, not only causal, that is only explored nomothetically. A sociologist cannot deny the fact that the structures are different, and not only formally exclusively, so that the social relations of bodily asceticism, regardless of the structure into which it is incorporated, gains a different status of meaning every time and takes on another meaning. Indeed, the relationships of asceticism always obtain the same, the lowest rank, which in every social reality remains only a "local road". However, each time it is justified by reasons of good appropriate to this structure, the locality in which it is included, changes. For example, a local road to a church symbolises a relationship towards deification, whereas the local road to a death camp leads to the humiliation of the dignity of the person; both roads are included in radically different meanings of the social relations of asceticism.

Another issue is whether a sociologist, who is expected to assume the position of a theorist by using the inductive method to recognise the causality of social relations, has the power to evaluate the ideological content of social structures. Or in other words, can a sociologist, who perceives differences between the reasons for the main social structures assess the superiority of one over all the rest. After all, the reasons which are their prime *fundamentum* cannot be equal to each other. In other words, can they express judgements about the good itself, and as a result replace them with related theoretical judgements? Can a sociologist "switch" his knowledge of the social structures of theoretical rationality to normative rationality, and thus enter into the role of a philosopher of values, a philosopher of society and a philosopher of culture?

As it is known, sociologists have been asking themselves for a long time "whether they should also hold philosophical values?" [8, p. 460], because they are aware that not only an extraordinary diversity of values can be found in the world. "As a result, every sociologist who decides to apply their knowledge to solving a specific problem is, willy-nilly, involved in a dispute over values and norms" [8, p. 462].

So when the sociologist discovers that social structures, despite formal similarity, are different in ideological content the process of their evaluation must be initiated, in particular those that affirm the desirability of their goods as the supreme reason. In this light all the relationships of this structure, including the social relations of bodily asceticism, take on the same meaning. If, however, he refuses to express his opinion about the good, as the guardian of the purity of his methodological study, he would still be unable to deny that good along with desirability rests in action and he would have to "adopt a certain metaphysical minimum related to the question of the good" [9, p. 98]³.

In the search for differences between world societies sociologists and philosophers "are agreed on the fundamental issue". As Znaniecki wrote, "the highest values are the values that have positive significance for all mankind" [10, p. 500]. Leaving aside the question of "refraining oneself from issuing value and normative judgements" by sociologists (as methodologically important in itself) - they would not escape inquiries about cultural universalism, contained

³ R. Masarczyk wrote in her critical commentary on Ossowska's sociology of morality: "she left out in a planned manner [judgments about the good - A.P.], claiming that the question of the absoluteness of the good is a matter of faith, not a matter of science" [c.f. 9, p. 98].

in the humanistic *truths* of the ideal, or moral relativism sustained by other cultures, or depressive natural national-conservative social structure – in other words, politically correct authoritarianism. In search of differences between super-systems and their cultures, which were designed to evaluate the good contained in them, moralising sociologists, or social philosophers, (including philosophers of values and philosophers of culture) use the results of their scientific exploration to elevate some, as the *better* ones by applying universal humanistic tests and by recognising the *worse* ones. The better ones are those which, generally speaking, prioritise the good of human beings over impersonal beings, or, by liberating man to freedom without limits, condemn him to solitude. Despite logically irrefutable evidence contained in the judgements of *society-culture*, philosophers have not escaped accusations of moralising. It is as if the judges assessing the moral evil of the genocidal actions of war criminals during the Nuremberg trials were accused of errors in normative reasoning, even though all the judges knew from which source of the truth about the supreme good they were taking orders from, in order to formulate their conclusions infallibly. So when a sociologist is involved in a dispute over values, while facing a homicidal super-system of authoritarianism of communism on the one hand, and a super-system of national-conservative democratism on the other (incidentally, destroyed by the first one), they cannot settle for the inductive exploration of the explanation of the causality of both. If they only want to do more for the truth about cultural TRUTH, they have the right to deliver equally serious scientific judgements about good and evil, deductively derived from the axiomatic premises of some supreme law of ethics. Obviously, even if were accused of “falling out of the role of an objective researcher describing different value systems and different ‘truths’, irreducible to one another, while occupying the position of a moralist who judges which of these systems is better and where the Truth written with a capital letter is” [6, p. 727], the truth would in a strictly scientific sense still be on his side, when he revealed that some social super-systems were deadly structures to those of a different race or class, whereas others contain the social relations of the affirmation of life. At the same time he must recognise the differences between bodily asceticism justified by reason of hatred towards strangers, and – at the opposite pole of ethical judgement asceticism – justified by the good of life for personal dignity.

In general, the sociologist must see the difference between a super-system which takes into account the demand for humanistic ideals and the primacy of man over society, and a super-system ranking an impersonal being as a supreme one. This is generally utopian and theoretically invalid, and therefore imaginary, and unattainable in light of the principle of causality. By this its priority to man or yet another super-system is assumed, in which the external freedom of the individual is the absolute good, achievable through the objectification of society. It thus postulates the freedom of expression of an individual’s actions for themselves, based on the principle of getting rid of responsibility for another individual, who is also free in their individualistic actions. The first of the super-systems “for the development of man as a person” may be called *humanistic*, the second “against the person” known as *anti-humanistic*, and the third, with its characteristic horizontal structure “next to the person,” *unhumanistic*. Almost every sociologist has written about an authoritarian super-system, but when it comes to identifying a “better” super-system that would include the truth “with a human face” in its culture then the very act of praising it was

negatively judged by other scholars as falling out of the role, or more scornfully – moralising. A Bolshevik intellectual – Sorokin, experienced this at one point when he dared to elevate the *ideational* (thoroughly humanistic) super-system above other super-systems, and to judge the *sensate* super-system (ahumanistic, strongly unhumanistic) – critically. Indeed he prophetically foresaw the collapse of the liberal ideal, and called this super-system of hedonism and moral relativism “the villain of historical drama” [6, p. 727], long before the explosion of excitement about liberal philosophy, which valued the super-system of liberal democracy above all others. Hardly anyone noticed the conceptual absurdity included in it (negative freedom as an artefact). And only a few sociologists – those heading towards social philosophy – recognized hidden relations of tyranny (*soft* authoritarianism) in its structure. This was proved by Roger Scruton [11] and by Ryszard Legutko [12], who clearly laid out the weakness of the liberal ideal. Florian Znaniecki also negatively assessed the communist super-system, and, as one of the very few sociologists of explicitly philosophical disposition, he stated that there should be “a worldwide continuity of the development of new, culturally creative human personalities”. He probably did not care about being accused of falling out of the role, which is can be confirmed by the significant subtitle *The Decline of Western Civilization. A Sketch from the Interface of Cultural Philosophy and Sociology* [13]. Similarly, in a subsequent sociological treatise, *Modern Nationalities*, he includes philosophical considerations about the unity of the world. In his criticism of ochlocracy, racial imperialism, Bolshevism and the materialism of Western society he preceded even Sorokin. However, he was not naive. While presenting the philosophical concepts of the unity of the world, he expressed the view that a transnational world culture “has not been, and never will be, fully, definitely formed”, and he did not share the expectations of those social philosophers who believed that “the future history of humanity will go towards the creation of a common secular culture (“civilisation”) and a politically-united global society” [13, p. 251, 252].

Both men critically evaluated Bolshevism and communism, as each recognised, in his own way, the *ontology of humanistic pretence*⁴ contained in them: a super-system with an inhuman face which pretended to serve an individual, whereas in fact, it reduced the individual to the level of a “fertilizer of history”. In light of the theory of social structure, the super-system of enslavement took on a vertical shape, while authoritarian coercion was the relationships causing a state of absolute dependence in every lower-rank relationship. Bodily asceticism, as the lowest-ranked social relation in the social structure, was consistently included in the political structure, and became part of the rationale of statehood. Asceticism took on the meaning of citizenship, and from that time on, was induced “top-down” with constant rigour by central government and “bottom-up” – through terror by local authorities. The same meaning was adopted by the school of asceticism, which was directly subordinate to the structure of the appointed office of physical culture and, indirectly, to the structure of the party and state. It was, in fact, included in the network of direct relationships between politics and partisanship; it was entirely permeated with the rationale of revolutionary citizenship.

⁴ The notion of ontology of humanistic pretence was used by Jadwiga Staniszkis [c.f. 15].

BODILY ASCETICISM AND NATIONAL IDEALS

Where **methodological structuralism** is concerned, i.e. the method of exploring society – reduced exclusively analytically to a network of relations – then first and foremost, we must consider society as the whole of global humanity, “the whole human race”, involving a “transnational world culture”. Secondly, we must consider nationally-specific societies, in which bodily asceticism is always justified by the rationale of the highest ideals of “national unification, national progress, national mission and national independence as declared by national thinkers” [6]⁵.

The inclusion of bodily asceticism in the world’s social structures (i.e. a reality for all the nations of the world), which is generally referred to as *healthiness*, took place through the intervention of the intellectual leaders of “healthiness international” which included ethicists, educators, sociologists, psychologists and doctors. Through their social networks of influence they justified the reasons for a health asceticism (or more generally speaking, the reason for *the quality of life*), with their good personal, public and professional. They then started to introduce it to the educational structure of health asceticism which was created from scratch. They, therefore, incorporated their national health educational structure into the structure of international healthiness, which praised the existential reason for the asceticism of healthiness all over the world, wherever such a “structure in the structure” was to be created (under the name “network of health-promoting schools”)⁶. The international asceticism of healthiness reinforces the resonance of its ideal – the *quality of life* – thanks to the ideal of quality of earthly life, which is now expressed more and more loudly. This ideal of earthly life is ranked higher than the reason of healthiness for the quality of social life, i.e. the ideal of the vitality of the species for the quality of life in the global community⁷.

At a national level of learning about society, to which the issue of social structures refers, all the relationships that are fundamental to the suitable ideal – adopted because of an intellectual leader – are preceded by bodily asceticism. This is a necessary relationship and comes about in every case directly from the national ideologue. They not only initiate its validity, at the level of management structures, but, more importantly, “post on the net” the ideological justification of its rationale. This originally comes from the fact that the leader of a nation, just as the father of a family – acting *on the principle of leadership, not authority*⁸ – is guided by a sense of responsibility for the intergenerational continuity of the life of the cultural community, and obviously for its present-day existential success. He includes in the structure of the national network of *gymnasion*, relationships from the academic and scientific, and pedagogical and educational fields, and between a teacher and a student, to arouse the spirit of bodily asceticism. This leads to the intensification of healthiness and vitality (including reproduction), and when the need of history is pressing – to improved combat efficiency. In the public and national network of health asceticism, first place always goes to the intellectual leader

⁵ These ideals were distinguished by Znaniecki, although in the treaty “Modern nationalities” he was not consistent while considering the basis on which the organisation of the nation. Jerzy Szacki writes about it in the introduction to the works of Znaniecki; Z. Znaniecki, *Współczesne...*, p. XVII.

⁶ Out of necessity, I have to omit the story of the worldwide movement for healthiness and the history of health education and, more broadly, the history of public health, contained in it. Its textbook version was presented by Barbara Woynarowska [c.f. 16]. The World Health Organization (WHO) most accurately reflects the name of the structure of international healthiness.

⁷ The last climate summit, which took place in Paris (2015), gathered the leading representatives of all state communities of the world. In this way, it confirmed the update of the universal social structure, bearing the idea of cosmic vitality.

⁸ Znaniecki distinguished these two principles [c.f. 14].

of the super-system that includes in academic, expert and decision-making relationships in the general social network. However, in a situation where the social structure of physical culture does not yet exist, it begins to create it *from the beginning*, by establishing expert and advisory relationships⁹. The structure of every national society contains inclusive structures of bodily asceticism, as its inalienable particle, which funds the national total fulfilment towards the ideal, and which also provides the lowest in the hierarchy of networks with justification of its fullest meaning. In a miniature version, reduced to the social structure of the family, bodily asceticism is validated by linking this relationship to the ideal, analogous to national unification, namely the unification of the community on the basis of the reciprocity of selfless service. This is manifested most fully in one person's social relations with other people.

BODILY ASCETICISM IN A COUNTRY'S SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The system of bodily asceticism obviously does not include itself in the social structure of a nation. It should be remembered that this network is a relational being and owes its inclusive location in the larger social structure to the entity of a higher rank. As this is an appetitive factor of *leadership* – as in the case of a nation – it can give the network a certain legitimate ideological topicality. The leader of a nation shows both prudence, when the network of bodily asceticism is updated, and also wisdom, when its meaning justifies a period of prosperity in the community's well-being.

In the case of the appetitive factor in the political *power* of the state, updating the social structure of physical education is by no means certain or obvious. In particular, it is not clear if the head of state does indeed intend to serve the nation if they are guided by selfishness. A selfish ruler relinquishes responsibility for the life of the nation and puts up with its ideals through silencing discourse on values or by giving them discretionary meaning. At the same time, he encourages others to replace the morally charged promise of life for another person with an "oath" of living for oneself to overcome the social relations of community to marriage and parenthood. Thus, in the long term – defined as the ancestral and national – and through the adoption of a relationship towards the self and in the individualistic freedom of a socially-isolated single, a final version of discretionary self-determination – the individual citizen is deprived of a sense of national belonging. A political ruler who thinks only about his own well-being and who joins in the establishment's network of collective selfishness (as happens in liberal-democratic tyrannies), is not morally empowered to arouse in himself responsibility for the public good and to accept the national ideal as the only right political structure even though he may feel pricks of conscience. One excludes the other. It is, therefore, no wonder that in the political structure of the tyranny of collective selfishness the social relations of concern about the biotic status of the nation do not appear. This is characteristic of the structure of a *cratocracy* (the "power for the ruler"), where the establishment plays a cynical game with the orphaned society of apparent concern for public health¹⁰.

⁹ A good example of establishing a national system of bodily asceticism from the beginning can be the social structure of physical culture created by the Head of State Jozef Pilsudski, which in the first phase of its validation was justified with the ideal of national independence. When the experts did not fulfil the expectations of Pilsudski (1927), he started himself to establish the crucial relations, which led to the formation of a national system of military asceticism (Central Institute of Physical Education was created between 1925 and 1929).

¹⁰ Cratocracy as a degenerate form of government was described by Krzysztof Szczerski. [c.f. 17].

By rejecting the national ideal, in this way the ruler moves away from responsibility for updating the social structures of physical culture, of medical culture, of the culture of living and the culture of dying, which the community depends on. In *the politics of life* that he establishes he confers on each individual the responsibility of updating their own asceticism of healthiness, and enables them to select their own interpretation from the field of meanings. The ruler does not care about the kind of structure of being that others create. The ruler does not care whether people establish social relations with each other to confirm their identity in the next generation. For an authority immersed in an individualistic selfishness and wandering in the wilderness of moral relativism, national well-being may no longer exist. Since everything is allowed, the social structure of the nation can be “dissolved”, and the hanging “loose ends” of meaningless relationships can be grafted as hybrids to the network of Europeanism.

BODILY ASCETICISM WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE FAMILY COMMUNITY

In a miniature version of national society, which can be reduced to the family structure, bodily asceticism is refreshed by linking this relationship with the ideal analogous to *national unification*, in other words, *community unification*. This is carried out according to the principles of mutual voluntary service, which are manifested most fully in the relationship of *one person living for another person*. As in any other social structure, the social relations of rationale for asceticism are instigated within the family networks of an intellectual leader. It is never initiated by itself, because, as with the previously-discussed *accidens*, it enters the experience of participants within the community thanks to a moderator. Although a family structure “emerges” from the network of natural structures – which the *logos* of physical significance is a part of – it is manifested in the sexual differentiation of femininity and masculinity. However, the desire to maintain the diversity of this ontological structure – which conditions social life – is preceded by the acquisition of deductive knowledge of both its metaphysical and ethical codes. As this is a hermetically coded structure of being, it can be said bluntly that, *nomen omen*, not every head of a family is able to recognize their “expectations” on the basis of reading the sense contained therein. Similarly, not every “head”, i.e. person asks himself questions about the meaning of the physical universe, which is, perhaps, encoded in its mathematical structures¹¹. Perhaps because *not everyone is granted the ability* to get to know the meaning, the status of *head of the family* is given only to intellectually-empowered elders, who exceed the knowledge of others, but who are also capable of bravely adopting naturalistic metaphysical assumptions about Rationality “inherent” in bodily nature [18]. Is this not the naturalistic assumption Kołakowski had in mind, when he deduced, as did most philosophers who followed the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas – who saw moral reasons in bodily structure – that in order to recognise natural law “one needs faith in something that can be called the constitution of a moral being, besides physical constitution, and that the constitution coincides with the rule of Reason in the world” [19, p. 222].

¹¹ There is a reason why I am quoting here a philosophical treatise by Michal Heller, evocatively titled “The meaning of life and the meaning of the universe”, Biblos, Tarnów 2002, in which the author recognises that “in the environment of Sense life is worth living” [1, p. 208]; however, to reach such a conclusion owing to one’s deductive thinking, one needs to equip themselves with a tool and later use it to gain cosmological and theological knowledge. Thus the mystery of Meaning is given only to the one who looks for it. Not every head of the family can get to know the meaning of corporeality, and certainly not the head that does not even think that the meaning of ontological structure of being can be applied to the living body.

The complexities of logic do not so much identify the weaknesses of knowledge, but rather point to the complexity of the metaphysical social relations of *logos* – in the double sense of: mathematical Rationality and ethical wisdom – with bodily nature. Despite these complexities this is really about granting to the pure and practical human mind the ability to: 1) identify mathematical *logos*, “providing” our pure cognition with the idea of the perfection of the bodily structure (*what the perfection of the body is all about*), and 2) the *logos* of ethics, which directs practical cognition towards responsibility for the active affirmation of bodily nature (*the fulfilment of obligations which are expected from human bodily nature*).

Pure reason which allows insight into the *mathematical logos* and which decides about the perfection of bodily nature leads to the conclusion that there would not be family as a primary inter-subject correlation if in the natural order human beings were not ontically, within the structure of being, essentially diversified according to bodily gender. This has the characteristics of bilateral mutual relationships (*relatio mutua*) and also manifests itself as a symmetrical structure of kinship, obviously including relationships with the offspring and the elders of both parties. Indeed, there would not be any social structures (not only family structures), if the structure of human beings were not “reasoned” by the preceding mathematical structure. This is the *logos* of bodily structure, in two equally dignified entities: a woman in relation to a man and a man in relation to a woman. These entities are different in their essence, but remain complementary relational elements: of masculinity for femininity and femininity for masculinity. If it were not for the *logos* of bodily gender, expressed by the invisible mathematical structure, society (as we know it) would not be possible. And further, while considering the bodily condition of the family social structure a revelation takes place which recognises that “some” normative message is contained in corporeality, not just in its sexuality. Given the practical rationality of the *head* of the family, it may be said that the formulation of obligations to bodily nature known as natural law “is not an abstraction or any text to read and quote randomly by some casuists. It is just Reason in operation” [20, p. 195]. In fact, one has to work hard to reach the encoded message; the inquiring subject may call it natural law, but the subject can also conclude that bodily nature holds wisdom which is synonymous with the *logos* of ethics. Bodily nature is the first source of laws outlining the elementary principles of “dealing with” bodily nature, and the resulting opinions concern the obligation of moral conduct to bodily nature.

Therefore, are the two *logos* not the first principle of the physical universe, and thus the constituent cause of perfection in human bodily nature?¹² So, just like those people who “can be cognised”, and indeed, “processed” from metaphysical truths to logical truths and “allowed” to enter the practical reasoning of the head of the family and the supreme head of the national thinker’s *family of families*, he would commit himself to produce a network affirming bodily life, guided by a desire for the welfare for his own people. He would also seek to establish a relationship with bodily asceticism within this network, one that favoured imbuing the family structure with a moral ideal, since he would make the social relations leading to it really fortunate.

¹² M. Heller wrote that man intended by God is equipped with rationale in two meanings. In this meaning, two elements must be placed: a rational “plan”, i.e. assigning man a place in the whole work of creation, and the element of “evaluation/recognition”, i.e. to treat an individual human being as a value from the very beginning. [...] Every man should recognise their own meaning and realise it”, because he is a self-aware being, and therefore able to get to know the meaning of the Universe, by exploring their meaning of life” [c.f. 21, p. 195].

Natural law leads the head of the family to understand that gender structure becomes the source of a person's life in their body. On the other hand, however, self-ownership in a living body becomes the condition of community life owing to the fact that bodily *accidens* help undertake actions directed to oneself and for one's own sake, and indeed creates, just by its relationality, the family community of people. The movement of the body is a prerequisite for personal action. This means that no social act would have been possible if natural bodily *accidens* – triggered by willpower and initially induced by desire for one's own well-being – were not contained in the human physical structure. This is a crucial moment in the labyrinth of meaning in which not only the head of the family but also their parents who begin to understand that if “any calling becomes the essence of their coexistence” [22, p. 90], in the network of any social relations, bodily asceticism should be given the status of indispensable actuality as a relationship supporting the entire social structure. Moreover, it is also important to establish this for the intergenerational future of the family community. Children incorporated into social relations of asceticism will have learnt the moral meaning of it by the time they are intellectually mature. Within the family network of asceticism they become active for fun, not realizing that the highest reason for health and leisure hedonism will for them be the love of a spouse, and then of parental love. In the structure of the family community, bodily asceticism is recognised as a lower ranking moral obligation. As the indispensable interpersonal lowest rank relationship, in relation to all social relationships within the structure of the family, it receives the highest rank of meaning, as it is justified by the good of love.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Every social relationship is logically preceded by the social relations of bodily asceticism, the structure of social physical culture lies at the ontological “base” of every social structure. It lies there inclusively, as a relational being of the lowest rank, of varying importance, according to the ideal standing at the top of social structure, which expresses a desire for the supreme good.
2. Bodily asceticism as a relationship of the lowest rank in the whole network of social structures has meaning justified by the rationale of the ideal – the supreme good: *this kind of ideal influences reason which justifies the relationship of bodily asceticism to it.*
3. The social relations of bodily asceticism do not justify its meaning. When it is a relationship for itself, it loses its importance (colloquially, it becomes absurd). We should remember that bodily asceticism is an inbred relationship, with a self-referential vector, and so as a relationship, it is extremely asocial [23]. Updating itself for itself is an ontological unlikelihood, as unlikely (in the meaning of metaphysical falsehood) as is a human as a socially-isolated being. Man as a *non-social* being does not exist. By nature, man is a social being, so he exists only relationally. If, therefore, as a fully socially-incorporated being, he fell into a state of inbred relationality of their own free will – they would cease to be the essence of what they are. If they solely fell into bodily asceticism, then they would not find a reason justifying its meaning. There is also the fact that by being outside social structure, (on the principle of “falling out” of its network) they would lose their sense of being.

By joining the social structure, they can justify the importance of each relationship and thus also the social relations of bodily asceticism.

4. The social relations of bodily asceticism, even though it is a being of the lowest rank in the whole network of the social structure, gains importance because the reason that justifies it is the highest good. It does not mean that this fact gives it its full meaning. By speaking of the full meaning of the social relations of bodily asceticism, I mean its justification of the reason for the good of a person's moral dignity – the supreme good, “brushing against” the holiness in humanity. Judgement in respect of the moral dignity of a person, which implicitly implies moral good over other good, is derived by deduction from the elementary principles of natural law. The reason for bodily asceticism may be an impersonal or individual ideal, giving priority to the moral value of existence over an existence morally related to the detachment of an individual's humanity. So the *fundamentum* of the social structure can be an ideal which is freely practised.

5. While contrasting the ideal of a person versus an impersonal or counter-personal one, we point to the possibility of its gradation, from the ideal proclaiming the creative development of the individual for themselves (in a relationship of person to person) to a subjective, non-personalised and individualistic (depersonalising), or impersonal and collectivist (degrading person) ideal. When bodily asceticism is justified by reason of an individualistic or collectivist ideal, then, despite the highest formal level of desirability of good which justifies the whole social structure, its meaning (humanistic) not only decreases but even totally loses its humanistic importance (colloquially, it becomes absurd).

6. Asceticism is a necessary intra-personal social interaction in respect of all social relations, except for those lead by a spiritual life, which assumes the negation of temporal life, and hence, of bodily life. In those circumstances bodily asceticism repressed by spiritual asceticism is transformed into a relationship of anti-asceticism – as related to the self-destruction of the ontic structure. This social relation of anti-corporeality is not the only one that “ruins” the entire social structure. Every other relationship contributes to the abolition or deconstruction of all social relationships that precede the social change, which lead from the affirmation of temporality to its negation.

7. In the social network, bodily asceticism is a potentiality. Its ontological constancy is expressed by the fact that it potentially lies within every social structure. Breaking the relationship for the sake of its validation happens when it is *thought about or considered*, whereas the state of activation is linked with the liberation of the desire to fulfil its meaning. Bodily asceticism is related to internal causality. It is performed “externally”, directed at its reality when its potential is broken down, first by thinking and then by appetitive desire. This is exactly as is in the case of quantum reality, where the potential becomes the state of reality, as a result of being tracked by the observer as a cognitive subject. The dependence of the social relations of the state of bodily asceticism on internal causality, and more specifically the top causality, in which the consciousness of the reflective subject elicits its locality, shows that in the timeless dimension, this relationship lies within the social structure in a state of potentiality (“awaiting” the observer who will turn it into reality). Even more

specifically, when we consider social structure in relation to the super-system of national society – then the whole social structure of bodily asceticism is inherently conveyed in the super-system as its “possibility”.

8. The principle of top-bottom causality, which determines the importance of the processes of a quantum brain [3, p. 28], allows us to understand why, along with the modernisation of the liberal-democratic state structure, the structure of bodily asceticism developed in the earlier structures of the authoritarian state, has been abolished. The state structure of physical culture ceased to exist when the ideologist, in the wake of the new idea, led it consciously to liquidation and unconsciously transferred it to a state of potentiality. I do not rule out the idea that the system of bodily asceticism will in fact be “thrown back” into the structure of the super-system of national society.

However, a quantum leap in the field of consciousness of the national ideologist would be needed. This, after initiating social causality, would lead it out of the state of non-locality and potentiality to the locality, the “place” awaiting it, which would justify its reason with a new ideal, most likely the ideal of *national independence*. A leader simply concerned with cultural heritage would be needed, one who would recognise that the intensification of the spirit of the new ideal depended on a “connection” to all the social relationships of the system of bodily asceticism – a network powered by the scientific mind of the community of national *gymnasion*.

9. The “awakening” of the system of bodily asceticism from a state of non-local vigilance “everywhere and nowhere specifically” to local reality has to be made as a result of a quantum leap in the leader’s thoughts. This awareness needs to be induced by the top-down causality of both a philosopher and a physical culture teacher. Despite the blocking of the connectivity of the system of bodily asceticism from the social structure by cratocracy, which is called community service a *distribution* of public resources, academic *gymnasions* survived the collapse of the state, or rather – each in their own local way – got used to the chronic threat to their existence. It is up to the nation’s thinkers whether the network of academic *gymnasions* is justified by reason of the praised ideal, or whether each of them independently – patiently bearing a hunger for meaning – will excuse themselves with the idealess reason of the market in physical services. This reason is undoubtedly important for the private network of fitness clubs, but fails to meet the expectations of the fraction of the community of scholars who constantly aspire to fulfil public tasks relevant to the cultural community of the nation.

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